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Epidemiology Studies-Relevance and
Significance in Litigation
Lewis Kuller*
I'm going to discuss some of the ways you can use epidemiolo-
gy, how epidemiology evaluates a problem, and some of the nu-
ances of epidemiology. I can start with a few commentaries
about what epidemiology does and how it functions, and about
some of the issues that are involved--especially at the present
time. First of all, epidemiology is successful, as I like to point
out to our students, in a situation which I call a chaos. An epide-
miologist thrives on a chaotic situation and that is, if there's an
earthquake, an epidemiologist can run out and study who got
hurt, who didn't get hurt and why. If an epidemic oc-
curs-suddenly a great number of cases occur and everybody
runs around and screams and wonders what's going on.
Epidemiologists do real well in those kinds of situations. A lot of
epidemiologists make their living cleaning up the mess that is
either created by the introduction of a new technology which
hasn't been adequately tested, or in getting involved in issues
related to medicine in which the introduction of a new drug or
surgical procedure creates an epidemic. I know there's a lot of
things that doctors are doing right now and I can guarantee that
in a few years they're going to get sued like crazy, and if I tell
them that they're doing it wrong now I'll become a leading ex-
pert witness. If I'm wrong, they'll just forget about it-if I'm
right, I can have something to do when I feel like retiring. I say
that facetiously, and I get some people extremely angry when I
say that, but I do it as sort of a somewhat humorous comment,
especially when I'm arguing with somebody about their treat-
ment and the fact that they haven't tested it scientifically and
about the fact that I don't have to worry anymore because Ill be
able to testify when their treatment turns out to be a disaster.
It's very different than what you think about in physiology or
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in laboratory science. A laboratory scientist controls everything
as best he can and tries to see what happens when he manipu-
lates the system in one specific way. People who work in basic
laboratory science sometimes get very confused about epidemiol-
ogy. Epidemiology functions in the real world, and in the real
world, everything is changing, so we have to use what exists
around us and try to understand problems and as we see, have
different methods of doing this.
The second issue in epidemiology is that there is considerable
confusion these days between what I would consider to be soci-
etal problems and science and epidemiology-what I call a little
bit of victim science. Some years ago I took a sabbatical leave
and I worked with Claude Pepper in the early 1980's. He was a
wonderful teacher and was very effective. He taught me right
away how to successfully get societal legislation through. He
pointed out that the way to do it is always have a victim. So
when we wanted to get legislation passed to allow the govern-
ment to pay for transplantation, all the scientists could come out
there and say it's too expensive and it doesn't work this way or
that way, and all they had to do was to bring a mother with a
child who was jaundiced, yellow and have the television cameras
focus on the child who was jaundiced, and we had the cameras
focus on the scientific expert who was telling everybody about
the health care cost, and you know who won. There was no
chance in 100 years that Congress wasn't going to approve the
money for transplantation when they had thousands or millions
of people watching television and watching the mother with her
child who obviously needed a liver transplant. That's not epide-
miology, it was a way of getting legislation passed which is good
for society. I worked in that area and I thought it was very
important, but it certainly wasn't science.
I'll give you some examples which are fairly obvious in the
area of the research related to breast implants. Most of the data
on breast implants suggest that they are not related to any
adverse affects to 99.9% of the people who are involved. The
American Rheumatism Association, the Organization of Profes-
sional Physicians in the areas of arthritis and rheumatism, just
came out with a blanket statement, which is unusual for any
medical society, saying there was absolutely no evidence at all
from the studies-and there were about twenty studies-and
almost everyone totally negative. Now the problem is that if you
come along and make this blanket statement several things
happen. First, the obvious statement is that you are being paid
by the company that's being sued-in this case, you're getting
paid by Dow Chemical or some other chemical company, and
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therefore you're a crook. So many of my colleagues who are
honest and spent their lives in academia and have suddenly
wound up doing studies are being tarnished or painted as being
crooks because they came up with a negative study. When they
started out they had no idea whether the study was going to be
positive or negative. Second is that you don't like women be-
cause, in essence, you're doing something which is against wom-
en and against society. So even if you're a woman investigator,
somebody will paint you that way.
Similarly, I was involved in the very first study in Vietnam of
Agent Orange. I happened to be working with some colleagues
who wanted to do a rather interesting study. They wanted to
study identical twins, one twin who had gone to Vietnam and
the other twin hadn't, and we were interested mainly in the
psychological impact of the Vietnam experience. At that time
nobody knew the first thing about Agent Orange. One day the
Veterans Administration called and said that there's an Admiral
who is terribly concerned, and Congress is concerned that there
is some chemical that was sprayed in Vietnam that's killing
everybody. They told us we had to do a big study to go prove
what this is, and they increased the $50,000 grant by millions
and millions of dollars. No matter how much money was needed
you could just go out and do the studies. Well, years later, after
many studies, an advisory committee that looked at these stud-
ies with the Office of Technological Assistance, a group of mostly
scientists and representatives of veterans organizations, conclud-
ed that the studies weren't going anywhere, and we weren't
finding anything of any significance, and were unlikely to find
anything. We recommended to the Center of Disease Control
that the studies be stopped. The next day in the newspapers I
saw a big article saying that Ronald Reagan had stopped all
these studies, and that this was politically motivated. It was
kind of interesting because I don't think Ronald Reagan or any-
body in his office had the foggiest idea of what a bunch of aca-
demic scientists were doing in some little room somewhere, in
making this decision, but it was kind of funny to see this be-
cause I had no idea and got very nervous about who the other
people in the room were and whether some of my colleagues
were really working for the CIA. These are the kinds of issues
you sometimes get into in these types of studies.
Another issue that's important is that many of the companies
have paid employees who are scientists, but in essence are em-
ployees, and you have to recognize that their job is to protect the
company. If you understand that, at least you're on a level play-
ing field. I worked on Reye's Syndrome and the problem with
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aspirin, and did a study with the most skeptical people in the
United States. In other words, we got the investigators who
were convinced that aspirin had nothing to do with Reye's Syn-
drome and designed a study with them which was supposed to
last three years. After it went six months, it was obvious that
aspirin was the major cause of Reye's Syndrome and we stopped
the study on ethical grounds. The study was being run out of
Yale and we told the Yale Human Use Committee that the study
had to stop. Well, I thought everything was finished and we
went to present this to the companies. There are a lot of people
from the companies who gave us fifty different reasons why the
study couldn't be true. It was so obvious that even the most
skeptical people were convinced. I said: "Fine. You can go tell
the FDA and other people that aspirin isn't related to Reye's
Syndrome, but the evidence is so overwhelming that there's no
question."
Another very important problem is the concept that we live in
a risk-free society and we're all immortal and that in essence, if
we behave ourselves we'll live forever. I can tell you right now
that sitting in this room you are increasing your risk of some-
thing. There is either something coming out of the carpet, there
is something coming out of the lights, there is something coming
out of the coffee you drank, or maybe there's something that you
ate today. If I look hard enough, I could find that every one of
you has something wrong with you. There is no question that if
I examined every one of you the amount of the disease in the
population is infinite. The only thing that is not infinite is how
much disease I find and how much people are willing to let me
subject themselves to my search for their disease. New tech-
niques that we had developed to find people who had very early
vascular disease predicted the likelihood of developing clinical
heart attacks, strokes, etc. One thing we found is that in our
studies of people sixty-five and over, is that 2/3 of the people had
fairly significant vascular disease and didn't even know it, and
yet they where at an increased risk of developing clinical disease
and we have good therapies to prevent subsequent clinical dis-
ease. But the reality is that I have newer and newer tests which
find more and more people with disease. We don't live in a risk-
free society and it never will happen. When we talk about cancer
risk of one in one million. We talk about the fact that everything
is risk free. It just won't work in the sense that we will always
find certain risks.
In relationship to that, we're always going to find an associa-
tion, whether we like it or not, between some adverse health
behavior an individual has and health. In the past we burned
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witches in the 17th and 18th centuries. We burned women we
thought were witches and men we thought were witches because
people got certain diseases. The Bible is loaded with health
regulations-what you can't do, what you can do, what you can
eat and where you can sleep. What is the rationale behind buri-
al practices in different religions? Why do you bury people? Why
do Orthodox Jews bury people within twenty-four hours? Why do
you have the burial and the services outside of the home? It's
very obvious-somebody had a contagious, infectious disease,
and the body had the likelihood to transmit the disease if you
brought it to the house and kept it there for a few
days-everybody in the family and everybody around the body
got sick and also died. The argument was that God, or a super-
natural being, was causing everybody to get sick. So you solved
the problem when you took the body and put it out of the house
and buried it very quickly because the disease no longer oc-
curred and you made an assumption that you were doing the
right thing.
We have the same problems now. We have people who try to
relate behavior or exposure to a disease or behavior that another
individual has. So we have people who try to understand why
people have arthritis or joint pains or muscle pains or headaches
or depression. Most of the people who have Gulf War Syndrome
have a lot of symptoms, which are very common. That symptom-
atology makes them sick. They really are sick, but they attribute
that sickness to some chemical exposure or some supernatural
phenomenon which they don't understand. All of us have periods
of depression, headaches, weakness, or fatigue. We know that
symptomatology can also lead to weight loss, loss of hair,
changes in immune function, and endocrine changes which one
could measure. We are trying to find out whether chemical x
causes migraines, chronic fatigue, arthritis, weakness, dizziness,
and headaches and relating them to particular exposures. Some
of that is right, some of it is wrong. But in essence we have a
tremendous problem right now. The problem is that we try to
prove that society is risk-free and that every problem in society
can be related to some type of an exposure other than our own
way of living, and we don't want to be the victim, we want to
find somebody else to be the victim for our problems.
Now I'm going to try to look at epidemiology and how we go
about doing it from a fairly conservative viewpoint, because I
think you have to be conservative when you look at some of the
studies.
We have exposure to a chemical which we might call x, in-
creasing the risk of the disease y, in a population called z. This
1996
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is very common-we have a population of people who seem to
have a higher frequency of contracting disease y and they claim
it's due to the exposure to chemical x. Now, there are three
things that happen. One, toxicologist reports that a specific
chemical found in high concentrations-chemical x-maybe from
the environment, maybe it's found in the food, water, air or soil,
at least in an animal model, is related to a disease. The epidemi-
ologist reports that there is a higher frequency of disease y oc-
curring in the community population z. So the epidemiologist
says that a lot of people seem to be getting the disease in the
community in the population. What often happens is that indi-
viduals living in the community report that they are sick, that
they have this disease y, because they have what we call a "clus-
ter of disease"--there's a lot of people getting sick. I get calls
constantly about people who tell me that everybody on their
block has brain tumors, everybody has colon cancer, or every-
body is dying of cancer. This is so common right now that the
state health departments and most of the government agencies
won't investigate these clusters unless certain criteria are met
because the cost of doing these investigations is astronomical.
A toxicologist evaluates the effects of the chemicals, usually at
high doses. A toxicologist will take a high dose of the chemical,
test various routes of exposure in an animal model on specific
tissues or cells, and relate the exposure to specific behaviors of
the animal, which might include things like cancer. The animals
can develop various diseases which mimic what they think is
happening in humans. Toxicology attempts to relate the chemi-
cal characteristics of the agent to other structurally similar
chemicals. Another approach-one of the areas we use computer
science-is to say: "Does this chemical look like other chemicals
which we know causes cancer? Does this look like benzene which
we know is related to leukemia? Does this chemical have charac-
teristics that might be associated with causing a cancer or dis-
ease?" Then we try to relate this in carefully controlled animal
studies. The conclusion would be that chemical x causes disease
y or a specific change in the structure of a tissue. It might
change the DNA. It is important to note that often the route is
not the human route. The interpretation is whether the animal
model is related to risk in humans because the dose is different,
and you have to extrapolate the exposure because there are
differences in susceptibility. There are some animals that won't
get cancer even though they are exposed to human carcinogens,
and there are some animals that are very sensitive, especially to
develop liver and thyroid cancers. If you expose an animal to
enough of a chemical and you cause cells to divide and also to
Vol. 34:851
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cause some changes in the DNA, you'll get cancer in almost any
animal model, at least at certain sites.
The epidemiologist essentially needs to find an epidemic. He
or she has to find the place where there is exposure of a popula-
tion to the chemical and where there is a natural experiment.
That's why I say we operate in chaos. We have to go around and
find either an occupation or community where there are people
who are exposed to this potential chemical so that we can deter-
mine whether there is an unusual frequency of disease y. That
is, it's increasing in frequency either in the population or in a
subpopulation which might be defined on the basis of genetic
susceptibility or co-exposures. For example, alcohol causes an
increased risk of things like head and neck cancers, but it does
so primarily in combination with exposure to cigarette smoking.
There are chemicals like asbestos where the risk of lung cancer
is relatively modest at lower doses. Asbestos is certainly bad,
but if you add cigarette smoking to it, the risk goes up tenfold.
The same thing is true of radon and cigarette smoking. Radon
itself causes a slight increase in lung cancer that's hard to mea-
sure, but if you add cigarette smoking the risk goes up dramati-
cally. So we want to see if there are co-exposures. And then you
come to the conclusion that chemical x causes disease y only in a
susceptible population of z, and that susceptible population x be-
comes very critical. Now where we get into trouble is the fol-
lowing: individuals in population z respond to newspaper articles
that chemical x has caused disease y in population z. What often
happens is that there is a claim made, often in a newspaper
article or somewhere else, that this is proven, not that toxicology
or epidemiology has proven that the disease y is being caused in
population z by chemical x. It appears in the newspapers, it
appears on television, radio, or 60 Minutes. One of the most
hilarious parts of the whole Gulf War Syndrome was a presenta-
tion by prime time television that somebody with Gulf War Syn-
drome found what we call hydrocarbons in the blood of people
who had been in the Gulf War, and that the hydrocarbons were
all related to the symptomatology. The hydrocarbons in the
blood have a half-life of about thirty minutes, and these people
have been out of the Gulf War for a year and some bright chem-
ist showed that when you put the blood into a tube with a rub-
ber stopper the hydrocarbons came out from the rubber stopper
and when he baked the rubber stopper, put the blood back in
again and reran the test, there were no more hydrocarbons.
They wrote to the television program and said they better tell
people, but there was no way they were going to tell people how
this guy screwed up.
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What happens is that small but financially successful groups
of epidemiologists, toxicologists, and lawyers get financial bene-
fits. Unfortunately this is often the real situation and it's getting
worse. Once the newspaper articles come in it's not hard to at-
tract a pool of, as I pointed out this guy who did hydrocarbon
testing and made a small fortune before somebody caught up
with him, or even a group of epidemiologists who make a living
doing this, and lawyers who join together. I did some work years
ago in defending Conrail against claims that it was causing all
kinds of diseases, and one of the most interesting things in giv-
ing the lawyers an education in epidemiology is that all the
Conrail workers were being examined in a lawyer's office by a
group of doctors in Buffalo and every single Conrail worker who
they examined either had diabetes, hypertension or heart dis-
ease. These workers were men in their sixties, going in there
with their blood pressure a little bit elevated because they were
nervous.
The roots of environmental epidemiology are related to two
things. That is what we call the investigation of traditional
common source epidemics, and an investigation of occupational
cohorts. Now what do I mean by that? Traditionally, epidemiol-
ogy grew out of the investigation of people who went to a res-
taurant or who went to a party and ate some tuna fish or some
egg salad which contained salmonella, staph, had some bacterial
organism or some virus, and when they got home they had diar-
rhea or vomiting. People then called their friends and said they
were all sick, called the Health Department, and the Health
Department investigated and found out that somebody with
dirty fingers got their fingers into the tuna fish or the egg salad
or the ham salad, or whatever it was, and the food sat around a
while at room temperature and everybody got sick. It happens
all the time. We've had this in Pittsburgh over the recent years
at one of the very famous country clubs. One sad but humorous
one was at a very good private school in Pittsburgh where the
lettuce was contaminated and the girls got sick, and they were
hysterical because they all got sick. It turned out that the let-
tuce was doing it-not the hysteria. And the second one was at
one of the religious temples in Pittsburgh where they served a
Passover Seder meal and people got dreadfully sick.
Now let's look at the problem. In a traditional common source
epidemic, people call you and say: "We're sick, we got a problem,
we're sick." You investigate it by finding out what the disease is,
how you can define it, and how you can identify what the people
ate. Compare the people who got sick with those who didn't get
sick and then try to isolate the agent and estimate what the risk
Vol. 34:851
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is. That's traditionally what we do.
Now what happens in an environmental exposure? It's exactly
backwards, and this is what gets us all into big trouble. What
happens is that somebody thinks that they got exposed-nobody
knows there's a disease. We go back and try to find out who got
exposed. We don't know what they're being exposed to or how to
measure it, but sometimes we have an idea. Then we try to
measure whether there is a problem. We don't even know if
there is a problem, we know that there is an exposure, but we
don't know if there is a problem. So we have to see whether
there really is a problem. Well, this is a very tough thing to do
in epidemiology because we don't know what the problem is and
we don't know what is the population at risk. This is a good
example of what happened with the implant story. There is a lot
of women who got exposed to breast implants, the breast im-
plants leaked and silicone got into the tissue, and silicone might
cause some type of reaction. Do we have an epidemic? Well, we
didn't ask them. We didn't have an epidemic of disease and we
didn't suddenly have a large group of women who had a disease
increasing in the population with unusual frequency. We started
out with the fact that we had an exposure and we had to find
out who got exposed and what disease they have-and we still
can't figure that out.
Now, what are some of the issues? First, we often can't define
the population at risk. So we have a class action and everybody
who was potentially exposed becomes the population-millions
and millions of people. Everybody exposed-whether they're
exposed or not they become the population. This is especially
true if it takes fifteen years between when the disease develops
and the time that people got exposed. We have to figure out who
was exposed fifteen or twenty years ago. We also don't know
what disease we're looking at. We are not clear what diseases
are and are not important. So what we're doing is using epide-
miology to study a nonepidemic, and it just doesn't work very
well, and that's a problem. We don't have an epidemic and we
don't know if there is an epidemic. We also don't know what the
agent is that we're looking at. Is the agent of concern, or are
other chemicals, or is it exposure to viral disease? We often get
confused between the environment and the agent that causes
the disease. We often say that because you were there-because
you were in this little town-you were exposed to the agent.
That's not causal, that just says you happen to be living there,
and that doesn't say you got exposed to the agent. We often
don't know whether the person was exposed to the agent, espe-
cially if there's no fingerprint of the agent. The only thing we
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can tell you about the agent is that it's somewhere in the envi-
ronment, and most agents have no good fingerprinting of expo-
sure. We have all these interesting problems about people who
are convinced that they live near a toxic waste dump, that the
water is polluted. There is something in the water that is caus-
ing their disease, that air pollution is causing a lot of cancers,
and this goes on and on. Some of it is real and some of it is not
real. Our problem is how you separate what's real from what is
not real in science.
The typical epidemiological study is of two types. One is what
we call experimental studies in epidemiology, and I do most of
my work in this area. The other is what we call observational
studies, in which we're observing what's going on and trying to
interpret it-we don't manipulate the system. It's very hard in
environmental studies to experiment because it's hard to give
people lead or mercury or asbestos and then see what happens,
especially with long incubation periods. So we're stuck with two
types of observational studies. In one, we start out with people
who already have a disease and we go backwards and try to find
out what caused the disease. We look at a comparison of some
control group. Second, we start out with people who are exposed
to some agent and we try to find out what the risk is of develop-
ing disease. They are called cohort studies, and case control
studies. We start out with the exposure and look for the risk of
disease and we start out with people who have the disease and
go backwards and see if we can find out what caused it. Now
just very simply, what you have to look at is whether the study
is worthwhile. There are certain things you can ask. First you
have to find out if there is an epidemic and if somebody can't
prove to you that there is an increased frequency of disease in
relationship to the exposure, whether it is an occupational
group, a community, or a group of people exposed to some drug,
then everything after that should be suspect, at least in my
mind, and I'm somewhat conservative about this. Then you have
to ask if there is an epidemic, who's been exposed and what's
the population at risk? How have you documented that these
people really are part of an epidemic? Then you have to ask how
the disease got transmitted in the population, what's the mode
of transmission, was it in the water, the air, or in the food, was
it person-to-person and is it actually a chemical? You also want
to know what the risk is. That's not only whether the risk is one
in a million, but is the risk to 20% of the people that get the dis-
ease? Women who have, what we call the breast cancer
gene-the BRCA genes-their risk of getting breast cancer is
about 80% during their lifetime, which is extraordinarily high.
Vol. 34:851
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On the other hand, we have situations where we talk about the
risk being increased twofold. The normal risk of a disease like
breast cancer is three or four per thousand, and in women pre-
menopausal, its about two per ten thousand. If I tell a woman
her risk is increased threefold and it goes from two per 10,000 to
six per 10,000, it may seem like a lot but if you turn it around
the other way, 9,994 women aren't going to get it as opposed to
9,998. And if I tell somebody that, they're not going to care. So
you have to know what the attack rate is and what kind of dis-
ease you are going to get. Is this going to be a disease which is
relatively benign, self-limited and of no problem, or is this going
to be a disease causing major disability? Next-what's the incu-
bation period? Very often, in scientific investigations and re-
ports, the presumption is that some guy got exposed to chemical
x and three weeks later he got lung cancer. You need to have an
incubation period. The incubation period for most cancers is
fifteen to twenty years. I get people who tell me they were ex-
posed to radon and six months later they got cancer. It can't
be-it just doesn't work that way. You have to know what the
incubation periods are of these diseases in relationship to the
exposures.
Is there an epidemic? There are two areas that you can look
at. One is geography and the other is temporal trends. In other
words, is there evidence that there is a higher frequency of dis-
ease in relationship to a defined population by geography-it
could be an occupational group, a little town, a census tract, or a
group of people who have a certain social interaction. Do they
have increased frequency of disease? Or the disease has in-
creased dramatically and over time there is a temporal trend.
One of the problems is that most of the chronic diseases that we
deal with are very long in terms of their development-the incu-
bation period. We really don't have good longitudinal or geo-
graphical data available to document an epidemic unless it is a
big epidemic. So one of the problems is that you'll have an argu-
ment about whether there really is an increased frequency of a
disease in a population, it's increasing over time.
A good example of a really red-hot epidemic was the so-called
toxic shock syndrome, which was due to an infectious agent
staphyoloccal infection. It was due to the fact that a different
type of tampon was introduced into the market and that tampon
was associated with an increased risk of a substantial infection.
We had an epidemic associated with the introduction of this
changing tampon. As soon as they took the tampon off the mar-
ket, and changed it, there was no more epidemic. This is an
example of an epidemic, the association was clear-cut, and the
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investigation showed what happened-they changed the product
and no more epidemic. It happened to have a very short incuba-
tion period which makes life easy.
An example where you get into a real mess is a study we're
doing in West Virginia, in the Charleston area. In the Charles-
ton area you have the greatest concentration of chemical indus-
tries in the United States, and some of my colleagues have been
very interested in the issue about whether there is an increase
in leukemia, lymphoma, or Hodgkin's disease in the population
in this area. From 1950 to 1954 and up until 1984 when the
data was compared to the rest of West Virginia and to the Unit-
ed States there was an epidemic of, in this case, cancers, higher
rates of disease.
We go into the county and we collect cases of people who died
from either lymphoma or myeloma leukemia and from what we
called comparison groups. People who died in this case from
heart disease or colon cancer, all living in the same county, and
we found a rather interesting phenomenon-that the risk in
people who died under sixty-five is about three times higher for
those who worked in the chemical industry in the county versus
people who didn't work in the chemical industry in the county. I
can't tell you in all honesty whether this epidemic in the county
is related to exposure to the chemical industry, but what hap-
pens is an interesting story. When you show this data to all the
chemical companies that are in the county the answer is very in-
teresting---each chemical company says it's the other chemical
company that is responsible for the problem. So you go round
and round, and each one of them does one other interesting
thing and that is they say we need to do more research. So the
chemical companies say that it's somebody else's problem and
you can't solve this problem until you do more research. Well,
there is obviously more interesting research to do, but the reali-
ty of the situation is that the research may go on forever, and in
the meantime the chemical industries might be related to specif-
ic cancers.
I did another study in West Virginia on air pollution from a
plant that was in Ohio that was spewing air pollution into West
Virginia. There was an increased risk of asthma and bronchitis
and they invited us to come down there and talk. I did this
study for the EPA and I found out that the community was
suing Ashland Oil in a class action suit for a billion dollars. I
can tell you that we got about $5,000 from the EPA to do the
study, and I walked into this room and I found out that they
were suing for a billion dollars. I really couldn't tell them wheth-
er Ashland Oil was responsible for the increase in respiratory
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disease because we did a little study there, and I couldn't tell
them whether it was something else, but they were going to use
this study to sue for one billion dollars.
The next thing you must ask if there is an epidemic is: "What
is the disease?" What is the definition of the disease? It's very
unlikely that we would have any increase in all diseases. The
only exposures I know that increase practically any or most
diseases are large doses of radiation. You can't say the agent
increases disease or cancer. Cancer is not one disease, so it's
unlikely it's increasing all cancers. You have to be specific. The
biggest problem you have is that people misinterpret whether it
is essentially a new epidemic or an old epidemic. The problem is
that the amount of disease, as I mentioned, is infinite. We have
an epidemic of prostate cancer in the United States and some
people have attributed that epidemic to exposure to chemicals.
The epidemic of prostate cancer is due to the fact that we devel-
oped a test called the PSA test for measurement of early pros-
tate cancer. Forty percent of men have what we call occult can-
cer. As you increase the number of men who have PSA testing,
you create a beautiful epidemic of prostate cancer and it's grow-
ing huge. Some years ago we did a study and showed that the
epidemic of prostate cancer in Pennsylvania followed Interstate
79. When you tested it, you find out that there was a group of
urologists who were moving up the road and doing tests as they
went. Somebody looked at that data and said it's due to some oil
plant in Titusville that is causing prostate cancer. Of course, it's
just nonsense.
Community awareness of disease may increase the likelihood
of diagnosis. If you tell somebody you have an epidemic of dis-
ease and the disease might be brain tumors or heart disease, it
will suddenly increase. Some years ago we had an epidemic of
heart disease and bypass surgery in Westmoreland County
which stirred up a great deal of controversy and concern until
we found out that a couple of cardiologists had opened their
practice in Westmoreland County and were successfully increas-
ing the number of patients being referred to bypass surgery. Not
to say that there is anything wrong with that-it's just that was
the explanation for the epidemic.
Variations in high technology can account for all kinds of
epidemics, so if you have women in one community having a lot
of mammograms, and in another community they aren't, you'll
find interesting differences. Sometimes the selection of one dis-
ease may lead to an increase in another, and by that I mean if
you get people to quit smoking, the risk of heart disease drops
dramatically and the risk of lung cancer hardly changes.
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If you wipe out hypertension and treat it effectively, you re-
duce the risk of stroke dramatically and you reduce the risk of
heart disease dramatically, but you have very little effect on
renal disease and so it appears that renal disease is increasing.
There is a lot of complex inter-relationships that one has to be
worried about in terms of what appears to be new diseases or
new epidemics.
You also have to determine what the population at risk is.
How do we define who's at risk? What's the population that is
likely to be affected if there is an epidemic? We can define it in
terms of social phenomenons-demography where the people live
and their occupational exposures. We've now got better ways of
defining populations at risk than traditional approaches. There
are big differences between infectious diseases, where it's easy to
ask people what they've been exposed to, where they've been,
what food they've eaten, and what school they attend than it is
when we're dealing with a chronic disease-especially in envi-
ronmental exposure. For instance, ultraviolet light (sun expo-
sure) is associated with epidemics of melanoma. So if you go to
Queensland, Australia, the rates of melanoma are off the wall
compared to the rates of melanoma for people living in Maine, or
in the northern parts of the United States. In that case, the
population at risk is people who happen to live in that area. You
can redefine that a bit more by looking at people who have un-
usual recreational activities. For example, children who get bad
sunburns early when they're youngsters seem to have a higher
risk of melanoma, and that's primarily related to their lifestyles.
So melanoma is an interesting disease because it appears to be
of higher frequency in the upper social classes. Why the upper
social classes? Because those are the people who can afford to
sunbathe on the beach all the time and get sunburns.
Another example, as you probably know, is the famous studies
that were done in Pittsburgh which showed that exposure of
steelworkers to coke ovens and benzopyrene was associated with
an increased risk of lung cancer. In this case the definition is by
occupational epidemic, and within the occupation, by a specific
exposure. So here we have two different levels of defining popu-
lation. Another good example is lyme disease, which is due to a
specific microorganism and to behavior. We have people who
walk through woods or fields and live in certain areas where the
deer tick is present with the organism. They have an increased
risk of getting lyme disease. And again, lyme disease turns out
to be, in most cases at least initially, an upper social class dis-
ease. In this case you could define it by geography and by behav-
ior.
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Cigarette smoking is not an important risk factor for breast
cancer, but there is an issue of susceptibility. Individuals who
metabolize the carcinogens in cigarette smoke in a certain way
have an increased risk of breast cancer. So in this case the epi-
demic is defined by specific molecular and genetic characteris-
tics. That chemical causes cancer in only people who have a
certain genetic characteristic, so if you exclude those people from
that particular chemical exposure, you protect them from dis-
ease. They are the only people who are at risk in the popula-
tion-those who have specific genetic characteristics.
If there is no epidemic, there are four possibilities. First, there
really is no epidemic and no association. Second, there's no epi-
demic because the people weren't exposed. The third possibility
is you have no epidemic because the risk is limited to a small
subgroup which is missed in your analysis. In other words, if
you look at breast cancer and cigarette smoking you find no rela-
tionship when you include all cigarette smokers and all women.
It's only that little subgroup, which you can only find by looking
for it, that has that relationship. So it may well be that there's
no risk because you missed the subgroup that's at very high
risk. Exposure may also be limited to a specific time in
lifespan-you get no epidemic because the exposure occurred at
the wrong time in life. Finally what happens is there is no epi-
demic and there's no disease because they haven't studied the
people long enough. If you come back ten years later, the epi-
demic which you didn't see is now an epidemic.
The next question is what's the mode of transmission? We
really have to understand how these diseases are transmitted to
understand who's at risk. A very good example is lifetime aver-
age blood lead exposure and its relationship to I.Q. There's solid
evidence that exposure to lead is associated with a decrease in
I.Q. Even a small change in I.Q. points is not good. In the popu-
lation level it has a major effect on the number of children who
are disabled, so it is a very important issue. Now the question is
where does the lead come from? You ask the automobile indus-
try and they will tell you it's because the kids are eating the
ceilings and they're eating the walls and they're getting it from
the paint. If you ask the paint companies, they'll tell you it's
because the kids are exposed to lead in gasoline. Now one of the
implications is that we took the lead out of gasoline. We made
the presumption that the lead was in gasoline. In general, the
blood levels in the average child declined as lead in gasoline
came down. Now studies show that blood lead levels in general
are extremely low in the community, except in certain communi-
ties where people live in houses which are very old and still
1996
Duquesne Law Review
have a lot of lead paint. But, in essence, the majority of the lead
in the environment came from lead in gasoline. Once that was
taken out, the epidemic was reduced but still existed in certain
populations. This is an example of where the source mode of
transmission is what we call a common source-the majority of
the exposure is from lead in gasoline.
Now, I'll give you another example of where this occurs. I did
a study in 1985. In this case, we asked men whether their wives
were cigarette smokers. These were men who never smoked at
all in their lives. We asked them whether their wives smoked
and we found that if the wife smoked and the man had never
smoked, their risk of getting a heart attack was twice as high as
for a husband married to a woman who never smoked. This is
-so-called environmental tobacco smoke and it's another hot is-
sue.
Does environmental tobacco smoke really increase the risk of
having a heart attack? It has led to changes in our laws and it
has led to a lot of law suits. A study took a group of individuals
and they exercised them on a treadmill. The individuals had
minimal coronary heart disease and at one part of this experi-
ment they were exposed to air. In the next experiment they were
exposed to carbon monoxide levels which would be consistent
with the levels that you would find in a moderate smoker or in
people who were in an office building or a room with moderate
ventilation and half the people were smoking. And again these
studies were done when a lot of people were smoking. What hap-
pens here is that when they are exposed to air, they were able to
exercise longer.
You can show, in what we call a case control study, the risk.
We can show experimentally the risk. Here we can begin to
document how the disease is transmitted. In this case it's trans-
mitted by exposure within the household environment to envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke. Now you can say the effect is small.
The real problem is susceptibility. In other words, if I have con-
gestive heart failure and I get exposed to low levels of carbon
monoxide and I happen to walk two blocks or something, I could
get into trouble. And there is a paper recently published from
Los Angeles showing that if I'm perfectly healthy and thirty-five
years of age, environmental tobacco smoke is not going to affect
my health. So you set up regulations and issues to protect a very
small segment of the population, and it might be 10% of the
population is at risk to be benefitted by these regulations.
Now what actually is the causal factor or agent? We have
some idea of how it's transmitted, and we have some idea how to
define the disease, we have some idea about what the risk is.
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What we really want to know is the cause of the disease. As
previously mentioned, we have two different study designs-a
classical case control study and a prospective study. One of the
real problems is dealing with low order risk. What is risk? Nor-
mally if I looked at toxic shock syndrome or Reye's Syndrome, or
smoking and lung cancer-the risk is ten times as high and
relatively easy to find the agent. Most of the exposures that we
talk about are relatively low risks. Generally, these are very low
order risks. People get very excited. For example, we have a big
population and the increased risk can be in the neighborhood of
1.01-that is it's a risk of 1 in 100 increase in risk of something
which normally has a risk of 2 in 1,000, which means you in-
creased the risk of 2 in 1,000 to 2.001 in a thousand. This re-
quires complex statistical analysis to understand what is going
on. I can only stress that no matter how complex the statistical
analysis is, the biological plausibility is often very difficult to
determine.
A study was conducted on the pilots/personnel who flew the
planes in Vietnam. They were the most occupationally exposed
group in Vietnam to Agent Orange dioxin. There was a study in
1990 to follow up on all of the Air Force veterans who were
occupationally exposed to dioxin in Vietnam. They compared the
deaths of the flyers with a so-called comparison group and tried
to estimate whether there's any excess mortality. There is no
excess mortality. The numbers are very small, but in essence the
study to date has found absolutely nothing-no evidence at all of
any excess disease.
A very complex exposure study looked at women who served
in Vietnam-and you could do the same thing for men-versus
non-Vietnam veterans through 1987. As you might expect, the
women who served in Vietnam have substantially lower mortali-
ty than the women who didn't serve in Vietnam. The rationale is
that the women who went to Vietnam were very healthy, a ma-
jority of them were nurses. When they came back, they just
lived longer because they were healthy people. It's called the
"healthy worker effect." There was no evidence of any increased
risk of cancer. So we have this study and almost all the studies
that we have done in relationship to Vietnam exposure and
Vietnam experience have been negative. Now why is that the
case? You can say that means that dioxin doesn't cause cancer
but that's pure nonsense. Dioxin does cause cancer, without any
question. So why do you get these different kinds of results? The
problem is that you get a negative result like that because the
individual has to be exposed-because they went to Vietnam
doesn't mean they were exposed to dioxin. Agent Orange had a
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very small amount of dioxin. You have to have evidence that
somebody got exposed to the agent of disease. Exposure to the
environment is not the same. Because I live in Pittsburgh does
not mean that I'm exposed to some chemical that might increase
the risk of cancer in a certain group of people who live in Pitts-
burgh. If a specific agent results in a tenfold increase in the risk
of disease, but the specific exposure is only in half of the ex-
posed, then it would appear that the risk is only fivefold. If you
think everybody is exposed, only a quarter is exposed, then the
risk will only be 2.5 because the other seventy-five percent who
you think were exposed weren't exposed. If the exposure is less
than a quarter in the population then you find nothing even
though there really is a tenfold increase in risk. You find abso-
lutely nothing, not because the agent hasn't caused the disease
but because you decided that everybody is exposed. So I would
not deny that there are women who were exposed to silicone
with breast implants who probably have a definable disease.
For example, as crazy as it may seem, the most interesting
thing about Three Mile Island is that few people got exposed.
The only diseases that came out of Three Mile Island were the
psychiatric diseases. Because the people thought they got ex-
posed to a lot of radiation, they became terrified and it affected
their lifestyles. A study showed almost no exposure with any
relationship of disease, and yet, we have a class action lawsuit
to collect money for people who were exposed to Three Mile
Island to a disease which never occurred in relationship to an
exposure that never occurred. So we now have an interesting
situation, we have no exposure, no disease, and a population of
people who unfortunately developed psychiatric problems associ-
ated with this so-called exposure which didn't occur. We were
very fortunate that we had very good control mechanisms. It
doesn't mean radiation doesn't cause disease because it
does-people just didn't get irradiated.
Dioxin may increase the risk of non-Hodgkin lymphoma, but
exposure to Agent Orange dioxin in Vietnam is too low to identi-
fy the epidemic. So you have to improve the exposure classifica-
tion and figure out who really got exposed. We convinced the
powers to develop testing for dioxin in tissues and blood in Viet-
nam veterans. Dioxin lasts for a long period of time-the half-
life is very long-and you can measure it in fat as well. They
looked at veterans who were exposed, and there was a little
dioxin in tissues and there was also a higher level in the flyers,
but the vast majority of veterans had similar levels to the people
in the population that were hardly exposed. They did some in-
teresting studies. They asked people if they thought they were
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exposed to dioxin, and looked at their blood levels. There was no
correlation at all. There was no relationship. They asked the
military to tell us where people were in terms of exposure to
dioxin and then compared that with the blood levels. They found
no relationship, and worse yet they found that when they went
back the second time to the military and gave them essentially
the same people, they didn't know it was the same people, and
asked them to reclassify all these people. They reclassified them
all the wrong way. There was no relationship between the first
classification and the second classification. Congress is spending
millions of dollars to try and do the same thing over again be-
cause it's perplexed by the fact that there is a negative study
and no positive study. We're doing the same thing over and over
again. But the reality is that we can't define exposure, and if
you can't define exposure, how are you going to define a rela-
tionship to disease?
The other problem we've got is an interesting one. That is the
fact that what you see and believe in is not necessarily true.
Just because somebody worked at a certain company and has
cancer does not necessarily mean that working there caused
cancer because, in essence, you have to have some idea of what
the rates are. There are two problems with this. One of them
has been called "confounding." By confounding we mean that the
association between a factor and a disease is more common in
the people who are also exposed to some type of an agent of
interest. The best example is that people who smoke also hap-
pen to drink a lot. Another example is the fact that people don't
like to live near pollution. They don't like to live near an area
where there's a waste treatment plant, a sewage treatment
plant, a toxic waste dump or a chemical plant. The people who
are healthy and upwardly mobile move out so that the social
class gradient is huge. The people who are sick and have health
problems can't move out because they can't get the money to
move out. So what happens is that you are impressed by the
phenomenon that there's a high prevalence of sick people living
around the toxic waste dump and you presume the toxic dump
made them sick. In reality the problem is that poor people live
near a toxic waste dump and are living there because they can't
afford to move out. Anyone who can afford to move out and is
healthy and has a job isn't there any more. It's a very classical
problem. When I was at Johns Hopkins, we spent ten years
trying to improve the environment and the health status of the
people who lived around Johns Hopkins Hospital, and they did
all kinds of beautiful studies, and it was wonderful. The problem
was that after working there ten years there was never an im-
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provement. I just came back some time ago and somebody pre-
sented another study doing exactly the same thing, and the
study we did in the 1960's was similar to a study that somebody
did in the 1930's. Programs started in 1930, 1960 and 1990 all
came up with the same results-there is no change. Why is
there no change? Well it is very simple. All the people who are
successful move out and don't live around Johns Hopkins Hospi-
tal any more. They moved out and they live in the suburbs. And
who moves in? People who can't afford to live anywhere else. So
it looks like it never can succeed. The only way you'll succeed is
like they did in Washington around George Washington Univer-
sity. There they knocked all the houses down and there aren't
any more people there, so now they're very successful.
One study surveyed people and asked them: "Do you think
you were exposed?" These were farmers, and they asked them
two questions: "Do you think you were exposed to DDT or a
pesticide or herbicide?" Thirty-three percent said they were
exposed to DDT. Then they said we're going to probe and going
to ask detailed questions to see if they were exposed. The study
asked more detailed questions. Sixty-seven percent of the people
said they were exposed. So when first asked, only 33%, but now
when you change the questions to ask them more detailed ques-
tions-67%. These are the same people-now 67% are exposed.
Now you can imagine what would happen if I took my cases and
I probed very carefully about exposure and in my controls I just
asked for volunteer answers in a letter. I find out there's a phe-
nomenal exposure to the chemicals between the exposed and not
exposed in the cases in controls. This is an example of bias. The
experience in Vietnam was the same. The experience in Vietnam
was that when they asked people who got cancer: "Were you
exposed to Agent Orange?" They'd reply: "Yes. It was raining
down on me every day." So it looks like there is a relationship
which doesn't exist.
A study we did years ago in an area of Pittsburgh, called the
Lawrenceville area, demonstrated a great bias problem. The
issue that occurred was that Lawrenceville had phenomenally
high rates of lung cancer. There were a lot of industries in
Lawrenceville and a lot have closed down. So we decided we
were going to look at this and see what was going on. We com-
pared the mortality rate in Lawrenceville with people who lived
in the South Hills of Pittsburgh, and there is obviously a big
economic difference. We found that the women who lived in
Lawrenceville had a substantially higher mortality rate than
women who lived in South Hills, and even after we adjusted to
age it was a one-and-a-half fold difference. This is a huge differ-
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ence. We said: "What's going on here?" People have attributed
this to environmental exposures. We also compared lung cancer
in Lawrenceville with the rates in the South Hills and there was
a big difference and it persists over time. Why did this occur?
Well, it turns out that there is a phenomenal gradient of ciga-
rette smoking by social class. Ninety-nine percent of the
phenomenon can be explained by the fact that as you go down
the social class gradient smoking rates increase. It's interesting
in Allegheny County that as you go all the way from judges and
college professors, and all the way down to people who were
unemployed, it was a perfect gradient, and a phenomenal gradi-
ent. Smoking is associated with a tenfold increased risk of lung
cancer. This is an example of confounding of social class, smok-
ing, geographics and lung cancer.
Now, lets look at problems of how many people get the disease
and what the implications are. What is the attack rate or inci-
dence of the disease? One of the most common diseases that we
see is angina, a type of heart disease. The incidence, even in
older people, is about six to eight per thousand per year. So if
we talk about a twofold increase in risk, we're talking about a
risk going from six per thousand to twelve per thousand per
year. It's still not a high risk.
However, we have another interesting problem-cumulative
risk. The lifetime risk of developing cancer is about 35%, and
that means if you live to your full lifetime, which is about
eighty, you have about a 35% risk of getting a cancer. This es-
sentially says that a lot of people get cancer. We're always look-
ing to find out why. So when a group of people get cancer we
have this problem about people calling us and saying that there
are twelve cancer patients on their street. Cancer is common.
One in three people ultimately get cancer, so if they live a long
time and there are a lot of elderly people in the community,
there's a lot of cancer. Fifteen percent of men have the risk of
ultimately developing prostate cancer. Twelve percent of women
ultimately are going to develop breast cancer if they live long
enough. What that means is that we have a lot of people with
disease or who are going to get disease. And we have a pool of
people in which we can find with disease.
I just did a study that looked at the risk of breast cancer in
women who take hormones. The evidence in the literature says
thirty studies show very little risk, but our study showed that
there's a substantial bias related to women who do and don't
take hormone therapy, and if you adjust for that bias, the risk
associated with hormone exposure could really be three times as
high. We may be picking out the wrong people.
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This next example deals with incubation periods. You have to
know the incubation periods of the disease. For example, with
cancer in asbestos workers, the mediate incubation period is
something like thirty-six years. So somebody can't tell you they
were exposed to asbestos last week and got cancer this week and
say that's a causal association. Thyroid cancer following radia-
tion is ten years. Leukemia in Nagasaki-seven years. Leukemia
in people who got exposed to ankylosis spondylitis and were ra-
diated-six and seven years. Bladder cancer and occupational
cancer-sixteen or seventeen years. You must know the incuba-
tion period, otherwise you make very silly mistakes.
Another problem we get into is the problem of women being
exposed to various things and having babies who have develop-
mental abnormalities and malformations. The organs develop
during the first six weeks or so of pregnancy. In fact, the organs
are developing when many women don't know they're pregnant.
You cannot get a teratogenic effect from anything unless the
woman is exposed during those first critical six or eight or ten
weeks of pregnancy-there is no possibility. You can get a
growth change-the size of the infant can be different-but you
can't get a teratogenic effect. A woman comes along and says she
was exposed to a chemical in the last trimester of pregnan-
cy-it's impossible to link that exposure to an organ defect.
Women are presuming that two years after they were in the
Gulf War that they are having babies with malformations from
being in the Gulf. It's impossible and biologically it makes no
sense. Exposure has to be in a defined period of time.
Let me stress that besides the risk not being identified be-
cause no exposure occurred, you may also miss the risk because
you've missed the incubation period-the risk is too short. For
example, aspirin may reduce the risk of colon cancer, but it
turns out you have to wait ten or twelve years to see what is
going to happen. So you have to ask when the exposure was and
how long you have followed these people to figure out whether
there really is or isn't a risk-unless you can find some early
markers of disease, in which case you might shorten the incuba-
tion period.
The last item I want to stress is susceptibility. Not everybody
has the same susceptibility given exposure to the same agent.
Let me give you an example of susceptibility in time. The exam-
ple looks at radiation in relationship to breast cancer in women
who are exposed to radiation at one point in time--Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. It turns out that the women who were at risk
given the same radiation dose were younger at the time of the
radiation. Sixty-year-old women were exposed to three or four
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mammograms and then sued because they got breast cancer due
to too much radiation. There is no biological evidence for that.
The risk-relationship is primarily in women who are in their
twenties. On the other hand, you don't want to do mammogra-
phy on women who are thirty-five and forty years of age because
they may be susceptible to radiation and risk of breast cancer.
So a thirty-five-year-old woman who had four mammograms and
then got breast cancer may have some justification. A women
sixty years of age-there's no justification-this is susceptibility.
There is a tremendous number of similar phenomena that we
don't know about where the interaction of your susceptibility
and the environmental agent results in disease while in 95% of
the population, nothing happens. And the critical question we
face for the future is: "What are we going to do about this?"
I think the one message to go out is that epidemiology is very
good if there's an epidemic. If there's no epidemic and they can't
prove to you that there's an epidemic and they can't define the
disease, then epidemiology isn't going to solve your problem. We
must say there's an epidemic, define what the epidemic is, and
then ask who's at risk, how the disease got transmitted, what's
the agent, and what you can do about it. But the first rule is if
there's no epidemic--epidemiology is not going to work.
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